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INFORMATION  NOTE 
ENERGY  REQUIREMENTS  AND  NUCLEAR  POWER  IN  EUROPE 
Leonard Williams,  Director-General  for  Energy,  Commission  of  the 
European  Communities,  prepared  the  following  address  for  delivery  to  the  18th 
Annual  Conference  of  the  Canadian  Nuclear Association  in Ottawa  on  12  June  1978. 
****** 
1.  The  formation  of energy policy  in  the  European  Community,  as  in most 
other countries  in  the world,  takes  place  against  the  background  of  an  assumed 
"energy crisis". 
It  is  important  to avoid misunderstandings  about  what  is  meant  by 
this!  Clearly energy  supply  now  poses  very  few  problems;  oil  is abundant  and 
energy prices are  relatively stable.  But  this  apparently comfortable position 
is  deceptive;  not  only does  the  threat  of political  (and  hence  oil  supply) 
difficulties  in  the  Middle  East  remain  with  us,  but  we  also  face  a  more  serious 
longer  term  situation.  This  is  that  unless  we  take  strong anticipatory action 
now,  rapidly mounting  pressure  on  limited world  oil  supplies will  during  the 
middle  of  the  1980s  begin  to  have  a  serious effect  on  oil prices  in real  terms. 
Some  figures  illustrate this prognosis.  Current world  demand  for  OPEC  oil  is 
about  30  mbd  (million barrels per  day);  by  1985,  on  current  trends,  it could 
exceed  40  mbd  - an  increase of  over  30  per  cent.  Some  statistics relating  to 
the  world's  largest oil exporter,  Saudi  Arabia,  point  to  the  same  difficulty. 
Saudi  Arabia  produces  oil  far  in  excess  of  the  financial  needs  of its  investment 
programme.  They  have  already  limited their production  to  8.5  mbd.  By  1985,  the 
importing  countries may  be  demanding  Saudi  production of  up  to  15  mbd.  We  cannot 
be  sure  that  Saudi  Arabia will  be  able  or willing to  produce  at that  level. 
2.  I  quote  these  figures  for  illustrative purposes  only.  The  lesson, 
however,  is clear.  Some  argue  that policy  intervention now  is unnecessary,  in 
that  the  laws  of  supply  and  demand  will act  on  prices to bring  about  an  automatic 
oil ratroning,  and  to  make  economic  other energy  sources  which  are presently not 
competitive.  Unfortunately,  such  an  attitude of  laisser-faire would  only work 
if large oil price  increases  could  result  in  new  production  from  new  investments 
in  other  sources  immediately.  But  the lead  times  in energy  investment  are  very 
long;  it takes  up  to  ten  years  to bring  a  nuclear reactor  on  stream  from  the 
time  of  initial decision.  Typical  lead  times  for  deep-mined  coal  in  the  U.K.  are 
5-8 years,  those  for  a  deep-water oilfield in  the  North  Sea  4-6  years.  Unless  we 
take  action now,  therefore,  to  reduce  our oil  demands  and  to diversify our  energy 
base,  we  shall  find  ourselves  having  to  make  very expensive  investments  in great 
haste,  and  in  the  meantime  suffer severe  economic  and  social hardship  as  a  result 
of higher prices  and  inadequate availability of  energy  supplies. 
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3.  A cardinal principle of  the  EC's  approach  to  these  problems  of  demand, 
supply  and  investment  is that  they  can  be  better solved  through  the  maximum 
degree  of  international  cooperation.  Energy  is  a  world  resource,  internationally 
traded,  and vital to  the  interests of  all countries.  The  nine  member  states of 
the  EC  base  their approach  to  Community  energy policy on  the  belief that  they  can 
achieve  more  through  greater  internal policy cohesion,  and  through  a  united  stand 
on  external  questions,  than  they  could if they went  their  separate ways.  But  we 
see  international cooperation  and  discussion growing  on  various  levels.  The 
industrialized countries  have  now  come  together  in the  lEA  (International  Energy 
Agency)  where  valuable  work  is done,  and  in which  the  Commission  of  the  EC 
participates.  Bilateral contacts  abound;  the  EC  certainly places  a  high value  on 
its biannual  discussions  with  Canada  in which  energy plays  an  important part.  The 
EC  is  engaged  in the  Euro-Arab  Dialogue,  and  in  similar  talks with Iran,  in 
which  oil questions  play a  prominent part.  The  CIEC  (Conference  on  International 
Economic  Cooperation•-''North-South Dialogue"),  concluded  last year,  made  a 
valuable  start to  the  energy  debate  involving producers,  consumers  and  the oil 
importing  developing countries;  it remains  to  be  seen  how  this initiative will 
be  followed  up  within  the  United  Nations.  As  the  energy  links  between  the  EC 
and  the  Soviet  bloc  become  more  important,  and  as  the  impact  of  the  Soviet bloc's 
possible  future  demands  for  oil  imports  is better appreciated,  closer consultation 
with  those  countries may  well  become  necessary. 
4.  After this  account  of  the  international background,  I  now  turn  to  the 
Community's  own  situation.  In  common  with many  western countries,  prior to  1973 
the  EC  had  enjoyed high  economic  growth  based  on  cheap  and  abundant  oil supplies. 
By  1973,  we  had  become  dangerously  dependent  on  this  one  fuel,  and  we  were  ill-
prepared to meet  the  challenge  of  the  Arab  oil embargo.  That  embargo  showed  how 
fundamental  energy  is to all aspects  of  economic  and  social  activity.  The  effects 
of  the price  increase are  still with  us  in  the  form  of  a  prolonged  economic  recession. 
5.  In response  to  the  1973-1974 oil cr1s1s,  the  EC  agreed  ambitious  resolutions 
concerning  a  Community  energy policy,  the  basic  aims  of  which  were  to: 
i 
ii 
iii -
6. 
substantially increase  the  efficiency of  energy  use  and  to  reduce  ov~rall 
consumption  level. 
' 
reduce  the  EC's  dependence  on  energy  imports  and  to  increase  domestih 
production  from all sources.  \ 
bring about  a  gradual  transition  from  an  oil-dominated energy  economy 
towards  a  more  broadly based  supply pattern. 
The  Community  also  laid down  specific objectives  for  1985,  chief  of 
which were: 
i 
ii 
iii·-
iv 
v 
to  reduce  overall consumption  by  15  per cent  from  the  forecast  made  in 
1973. 
to  increase  coal  consumption  to  355  million tons,  and  Community  coal 
production  to  300 million tons. 
I 
to  reduce  the  share  of oil  in total  consu~ption from  61  per  cent  (1973) 
to  50  per cent. 
to  reduce  the  Community's, dependence  on  energy  imports  from  63  per  cent 
(1973)  to  50  per  cent. 
to  install nuclear  capacity of  at  least  160  Gwe. 
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In addition,  the  Community  agreed  on  a  number  of measures  relating to 
energy conservation, support  for  the  coking  coal  industry,  limitations  on  the  use 
of  oil and  gas  in power  stations,  loans  for  investment  in nuclear  power  station 
construction,  and  to  an  extensive  four-year  R and  D Programme,  covering nuclear 
research  and  new  energy  sources.  These  were  complementary  to  the  various  but 
generally wide-ranging policies and  measures  introduced  by  the  nirie  member  states. 
7.  The  results  so  far  have  been  mixed,  and  although  the  immediate  world 
energy picture may  seem  reassuring  - with  no  major  supply or price problems  - the 
longer-term dangers  of  excess  oil demand  pressing heavily  on  prices  remains.  So 
there  is no  room  for  complacency. 
8.  It  seems  likely that  the  Community's  target  for  a  15  per cent  reduction 
in  consumption  by  1985  will  be  more  than  achieved,  and  a  25  per  cent  reduction 
from  the  1973  forecast  is  now  thought  possible.  But  this  in  large  measure  is  due 
to  the  prolonged  economic  recession,  rather than  to  the  measurable  results  of 
energy conservation.  The  Community  also  looks  likely to  achieve  its targets  for 
the  share  of oil  and  for  dependence  on  imported  energy.  Both  shares  currently 
stand at  54 per cent.  The  Commission has  proposed  a  500  million  ton oil  import 
limit  for  1985,  compatible with  the  overall  lEA  target  for  that  year.  UK  North 
Sea  oil plays  an  important  part  in this,  but will  not  contribute more  than 
20-25  per cent of  Community  demand. 
9.  On  the  other hand,  the  Community's  coal  targets will  be  difficult  to 
achieve.  It is not  proving  easy  to  increase  investment  in extra coal-burning capacity. 
The  world  coal  market  is relatively  small,  but  imported  coal  enjoys  a  substantial 
price  advantage  over  Community  coal,  which  is normally difficult  and  costly to 
mine.  Nevertheless,  the  Community  has  large-scale coal  reserves  which will  form 
an  increasingly valuable  source  of  internal  supply as  price relativities  change 
in  favour  of coal;  in  the  meantime  the  Commission  is pressing hard  for  the  adoption 
of various  coal  support  measures. 
10.  The  original  target  for  installed nuclear capacity  in  1985  (a  m1n1mum 
of  160  GWe)  will not  be  achieved.  It is  now  likely that  no  more  than  80-90  GWe 
will be  in  service  by  that  date.  This  slippage  is equivalent  to  about  100  mtoe 
(million  tons  of oil equivalent),  and  is  due  to many  factors:  technical  and 
engineering difficulties,  both with  the  reactors  themselves  and with  the  generating 
plant;  reduced  demand  forecasts,  and  hence  deferment  of  investment  decisions; 
public opposition  to  the  construction of nuclear  power  stations,  and  increasing 
political debate  on  the  subject;  and,  in  some  cases,  lengthy  planning enquiries. 
11.  The  Commission  of  the  EC  has  often  been  characterized as  being  obsessed 
with  the  need  to  "go  nuclear"  on  a  massive  scale  as  fast  as  possible  and  without 
regard  to alternatives.  Our  true position is very  simple  and  it is  that  we  regard 
the  steady development  of  a  nuclear electricity generating capacity as  one  of  the 
essential  components  to  a  balanced  energy  supply pattern to meet  likely future 
needs.  Although  nuclear  power  has  been  a  very  important  commercial  reality for 
twenty years,  present  Community  capacity of  23  GWe  supplies  only  about  3  per  cent 
of  the  Community's  total  energy  requirements,  and  about  10 per cent  of  our 
electricity output.  These  are modest  figures  and  do  not  indicate  a  reckless 
approach.  However,  looking  towards  1990,  taking  even  a  fairly pessimistic  view 
about  economic  growth,  and  bearing  in mind  the  obvious  limitations  on  coal-burn, 
the availability of oil and natural  gas,  and  the contribution  from  new  sources, 
up  to  12  nuclear  units will  have  to  be  ordered  each  year  between  now  and  1985 
if supply  requirements  are  to be  met.  This  in itself will  be  a  major  operational 
challenge  to  the  nuclear  industry.  ' 
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12.  The  Commission  itself is not  responsible  for  nuclear  investment  decisions, 
and  has  no powers  in this  respect,  although it does  grant  loans  for  this purpose. 
Nuclear  programmes  are  the  responsibility of  member  states.  But  neither member 
states nor  the  nuclear  industry can act  in  a  way  divorced  from  public  and  interna-
tional  opinion  and  obligations.  Internally,  Governments  have  a  clear duty  to 
present  the  facts  behind  nuclear  issues  to  their electorates as  objectively as 
possible,  so  that public  debate  may  be  based  on  information rather  than  emotion 
or prejudice.  The  Commission  of  the  EC  took  an  initiative in this  direction when 
last  November  and  in January  of  this  year  a  series  of  open  discussions  took place 
in Brussels  on  the  future  of nuclear  power.  All  shades  of  opinion were  represented. 
Another  noteworthy exercise  in public examination  into nuclear  developments  was 
the prolonged  enquiry  into  the  proposed nuclear  fuel  reprocessing plant at 
Windscale  in England.  This  process  was  immensely  painstaking  and  the  tenor  of 
the  evidence  was  witness  to  the  spirit of  objective  analysis  which  the parties 
to  both  sides  of  the  argument  can  display. 
13.  Externally,  the  advocates  of  nuclear  power  programmes  have  to  satisfy 
a  wide  range  of  international undertakings,  whether  on  a  bilateral or multilateral 
basis.  Many  uranium  suppliers,  including  Canada  and  the  USA,  are  insistent  on  the 
observation  of  certain restrictions  on  the  use  of  nuclear  fuel.  The  Community, 
in  the  Euratom  Safeguards  Control,  has  an established system of  checking  on  the 
use  of  nuclear  fuel  in all civil establishments,  and  is close  to  final  agreement 
on  the basis  of  its relationship  to  the  Inspectorate  of  the  IAEA  (International 
Atomic  Energy Agency).  The  Commission  is participating actively in  the  INFCE 
(International Nuclear  Fuel  Cycle  Evaluation),  now  well  under  way,  and  which  the 
Community  hopes  will  produce  constructive practical results which will  do  much 
to  solve  the  questions  of nuclear  safety and  non-proliferation. 
14.  The  Community's  attitude  towards  nuclear  power  is coloured by its lack 
of  indigenous  energy  sources,  such  as  fossil  fuels  and  uranium,  in  comparison 
with,  for  example,  the  USA.  This  h-as  several  consequences: 
i 
ii 
fhe··cornmunity  has  a  more  urgent  need  to build up  conventional  nuclear 
power, 
the  Cormnunity  needs  to pay particular attention to  the  efficiency of 
fuel  use,  and  to  the  conservation  of  uranium,  which  is  itself a  finite 
resource, 
iii  it follows  from  (ii) that  (a)  the  Commission  sees  advantage  in  the 
fast  breeder reactor,  which  could  have  a  fuel-use  efficiency of  about 
60 per cent  compared with  about  2  per  cent  for most  light water  reactors; 
and  (b)  the  Commission  attaches  importance  to  the  reprocessing  of  irra-
diated fuel,  as  a  means  of  fuel  recovery  and  of  reducing  the  waste 
storage  problem. 
15.  On  the  fast  breeder  reactor,  the  Commission  wants  work  to  go  ahead 
steadily,  so  that reactors  of  commercial  scale are available  as  an ·energy policy 
option  in  the  1990s,  if circumstances  require  and  technical  and  safety progress 
permit.  Several  experimental  and  prototype  fast  reactors  have  been  in operation 
in the  Community  for  some  years,  and  one  of  commercial  size  (1200  MW)  is now 
being built. 
16.  The  Commission  considers  that by  the  development  of  a  Community  reproces-
sing  and  recycling  strategy,  the  Community  could by  1990  reduce  its uranium requi-
rement  by  20  per cent,  and  its enrichment  requirement  by  15  per cent.  These  savings 
are particularly significant when  80  per cent  of  our  uranium  supplies  are  imported • 
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Reprocessing  would  be  an  essential element  of a  large-scale  fast  breeder  reactor 
programme;  and  action  in  this  field  by  the  Community  could  reduce  the  risk of 
other  states,  not  signatories  of  the  NPT  (Non-Proliferation Treaty),  engaging 
in reprocessing  themselves.  The  Commission  is proposing  a  high-level  study of 
the possibility for  joint ventures  in  the  reprocessing  field  on  a  Community 
basis.  The  aim would  be  to avoid  duplication  to  bring  about  efficient co-operation 
between  fuel  processors  and  users,  to  extend  access  to  users  in third countries, 
and  to  enforce  the  highest  non-proliferation  standards. 
17.  The  Commission  is also proposing  an active  Community  programme  in  the 
field of nuclear waste  handling.  The  intention is,  on  the basis  of  detailed  study 
and  the  pooling of  information  by  member  states,  to establish a  Community  network 
of  sites suitable  for  the  storage  from all member  states,  and  to harmonize  national 
practices and  regulations  governing nuclear waste  management. 